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 Eternal Recurrence and the Categorical Imperative 
Philip J. Kain 
Santa Clara University 
 
I 
Nietzsche embraces the doctrine of eternal recurrence for the first time at Gay Science 
§341:1 
 
The greatest weight.—What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you 
into your loneliest loneliness and say to you:  "This life as you now live it and have 
lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be 
nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and 
everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the 
same succession and sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, 
and even this moment and I myself.  The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside 
down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!" 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who 
spoke thus?  Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would 
have answered him:  "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine."  If 
this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush 
 2 
you.  The question in each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and 
innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight.  Or how 
well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more 
fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?2 
 
It is not enough that eternal recurrence simply be believed.  Nietzsche demands that it 
actually be loved.  In Ecce Homo, he explains his doctrine of amor fati:  "My formula for 
greatness in a human being is amor fati:  that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, 
not backward, not in all eternity.  Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it…but 
love it."3  In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche says:  "'To redeem those who lived in the past 
and to recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'—that alone should I call redemption."4  To 
turn all "it was" into a "thus I willed it" is to accept fate fully, to love it.  One would have it no 
other way, one wants everything eternally the same, "Was that life?….Well then!  Once 
more!'"5   
Some commentators raise the question of whether Nietzsche intends eternal recurrence to 
be like a categorical imperative.6  At Gay Science §341, we have just seen, Nietzsche said:  
"The question in each and every thing, 'Do you desire this once more and innumerable times 
more?' would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight."7  In the Nachlass, he also writes:  
"My doctrine declares:  the task is to live in such a way that you must wish to live again—you 
will anyway."8   
On the other hand, though, in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche says: 
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Let us consider finally what naïvety it is to say 'man ought to be thus and 
thus!'….The individual is, in his future and in his past, a piece of fate….To say to 
him 'change yourself' means to demand that everything should change, even in the 
past…9 
 
The obvious objection to understanding eternal recurrence as like a categorical 
imperative, it would seem, is that for a categorical imperative to make any sense, for 
moral obligation to make any sense, it must be possible for individuals to change 
themselves.  And Nietzsche denies that individuals can change themselves.  Magnus 
thinks the determinism "implicit in the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same 
renders any imperative impotent….How can one will what must happen in any case?"10  
Eternal recurrence seems to deny that an ought can make any sense at all.  
At the other end of the spectrum, those who do hold that eternal recurrence is like a 
categorical imperative, for their part, tend to ignore or deny that eternal recurrence is 
eternal recurrence of the same, that is, they ignore the determinism involved in eternal 
recurrence.11  In this article, then, I want to explore the extent to which it can be claimed 
that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative without underestimatng Nietzsche's 
belief in determinism. 
We must be careful to remember, then, that eternal recurrence is eternal recurrence of 
the same.12  That means that it is impossible to do anything in our present life that we 
have not done in our previous lives.  Nothing new or different can occur.  Nevertheless, 
the only thing that follows from this, the only thing we can deduce from what has gone 
on up to the present point in our current life, is that every detail must have been repeated 
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in our past lives (assuming, of course, that eternal recurrence is true).  We do not know 
yet, in our present life, what we are going to do during the rest of our life.  And eternal 
recurrence is able to tell us nothing at all about that.  Eternal recurrence gives me no 
information ahead of time about what I can or cannot do in the rest of my present life.  It 
is merely the case, rather, that whatever I do end up doing tells me what I must have done 
over and over in past lives and will do again in future lives. 
If I believe the truth of eternal recurrence, then I believe that in my present life I 
cannot change anything from my past lives, but I also realize that I cannot know ahead of 
time what I am about to do, that is, what it is I must do in my present life.  The fact that I 
take whatever I will do in the future to be strictly determined, the fact that it is fated, does 
not give me any information whatsoever about what it is that is fated.  It does not tell me 
that I must do this rather than that.  It gives me no information whatsoever about the 
details of my fate.  Only once I do whatever I do can I know that it was the outcome of 
the whole past and of all past pasts.  In short, all this determinism, rigid as it is, tells me 
nothing of what I am going to do in my present life. 
What, then, is the point of all the emphasis Nietzsche puts on determinism, if it gives 
us no guidelines concerning future action in this life?  The point, I suggest, is merely to 
generate a certain attitude toward whatever it is we end up doing.  This is what Nietzsche 
means, I think, when he says you should "live in such a way that you must wish to live 
again", and immediately adds, "you will anyway."  He is not suggesting that we do 
something different from our last recurrence, nor something that is not the fated outcome 
of all past history.  That, he thinks, is impossible.  He is merely suggesting a certain 
attitude toward whatever it is we finally do.  
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But still, isn't it impossible for attitudes to change from life to life?  Aren't they too 
the outcome of all past history?  At Gay Science §341, Nietzsche said that if the thought 
of eternal recurrence "gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or 
perhaps crush you."13  This might be taken to suggest that attitudes can change.  The 
claim that the thought of eternal recurrence "would change you as you are" suggests that 
in some sense you change, though also it suggests that in some sense you do not.  Eternal 
recurrence "would change you," yet you would remain "as you are."  We might be 
tempted to understand this as implying that attitudes can change in the sense that attitudes 
can arise that were not the outcome of past history.14  But I do not think we need assume 
that this is what Nietzsche means.  We should not water down his determinism without 
being compelled to do so for good reason. 
It is quite possible to stick with the interpretation that all things, even attitudes, are 
the outcome of past history and still make sense of change in attitude.  The basic 
characteristic of past history, its strict determinism, plus the fact that our life must be 
lived again and again, if we were to reflect upon this, if "this thought gained possession 
of" us, could easily cause (in perfect compatibility with the strictest determinism) a 
certain attitude in us, say, the attitude that we should accept this determinism and go 
along with it, or, as Nietzsche chooses to put it, the attitude that we should "live in such a 
way that [we] must wish to live again—[we] will anyway."  Thus, it can make perfect 
sense to say that reflecting on the determinism of past history (together with the fact that 
it will return eternally) could change us as we are.  This explanation of change is not at 
all incompatible with the determinism Nietzsche subscribes to, indeed, it is simply a 
result of it.  It is perfectly acceptable to hold that past history contains processes that 
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produce changes from one historical moment to the next, it is just that once we see what 
in fact those changes are we must take them to have been fated, strictly determined, and 
thus we must accept that it would be impossible to change them from the way they 
actually have been determined by past history (as well as by past cycles). 
So also, reflecting upon this determinism, upon the fact that nothing can be changed, 
upon the fact that all is fated, might cause a further attitude, perhaps the attitude that:  
'Fine, I wouldn't change it anyway!'  And if such an attitude were produced in us, then 
when we hear about eternal recurrence it might strike us as divine.  When we hear about 
our fate, we might love it.  We might even be able to turn "all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed 
it'."15  When we hear about all this rigid determinism, we could conceivably "crave 
nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal…"16     
So far, then, we have explained the sense in which change is possible for Nietzsche.  
The question is whether this is enough to allow us to say that eternal recurrence is like a 
categorical imperative?   
I think we can say that eternal recurrence gives us an imperative.  In Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche himself writes:  "Once man believed in soothsayers and 
stargazers, and therefore believed:  'All is destiny:  you ought to, for you must.'"17  This is 
to say that all our actions are fated, determined, they cannot be changed, and thus we 
"must."  But it is also to say that we should have a certain attitude toward this fate, that 
we accept it, will it, love it, that we "ought."  In short, the imperative is that we ought to 
"live in such a way that [we] must wish to live again—[we] will anyway."  
Once we adopt this attitude, but not before, we can be sure that we adopted it in all 
past lives.  Only then can we be sure that this attitude has been fated—that we had no 
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choice but to adopt it.  But until we adopt this attitude, we do not know whether or not we 
are fated to do so.  We cannot know ahead of time what our reaction will be when we 
finally realize that all is fated.  Our reaction could be one of horror such that we will be 
crushed by the fatedness of our actions.  Or the fact that all is fated, once "this thought 
gained possession of" us, might cause an attitude of acceptance.  Furthermore, 
Nietzsche's urging us to "live in such a way that [we] must wish to live again—[we] will 
anyway," together with his further reflections on eternal recurrence and amor fati, might 
just be the factors that tip us in the right direction.  Thus it seems to me quite legitimate to 
understand Nietzsche's urging as an imperative.  
We can also say, I think, that the imperative which eternal recurrence gives us 
involves a form of universalization—indeed, the ultimate universalization.  Borrowing 
Kant's language, we could say that Nietzsche wants us to act on those maxims we could 
will be repeated eternally—we will anyway.18 
Nevertheless, there are enormous differences between Kant and Nietzsche that we 
must attend to.  Perhaps the most important is that the Übermensch can will that anything 
be repeated eternally.  After all, he19 turns all "it was" into a "thus I willed it."20  He loves 
every detail of his life no matter what it is.  Suppose we consider an action like telling a 
lie.  For Kant, we cannot universalize telling a lie and thus we should not tell one.  
Nietzsche, of course, does not think that discovering whether or not a maxim is 
universalizable will or should determine our behavior one way or the other.  After all, 
whether we lie or not is determined by all past history and its eternal recurrence—it is 
fated.  It cannot be determined by the rational analysis of maxims alone.  Unlike the 
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categorical imperative, then, eternal recurrence has nothing to do with the moral rightness 
of actions.    
Nietzsche is not concerned with whether or not we tell a lie.  He is concerned with the 
attitude we adopt toward whatever action we do take.  He wants us to love every detail of 
our lives—whether we told a lie or not.  What matters is not whether we lied, but whether 
we love our actions.  Eternal recurrence is not concerned with what is affirmed, only with 
affirmation.  The Übermensch can act so as to violate the moral law in the most 
objectionable way, and yet still love every detail of his life.  As Owen and Ansell-
Pearson point out, the categorical imperative commands ethical content; eternal 
recurrence does not.21  
Nietzsche, then, cannot live up to the demands of the Kantian form of 
universalization.  We might also ask, though, whether Kant could live up to the demands 
of the Nietzschean form of universalization?  Can Kant fulfill the Nietzschean demand 
that he act only on that maxim he could will be repeated eternally?  Could Kant live in 
such a way that he must wish to live again—he will anyway?  Suppose that you have led 
a moral life in the Kantian sense, acting for the sake of the categorical imperative at every 
step—or that you have come as close to this as would be possible for a human being.  
Would you therefore be willing to live your life again—would you be willing to live it 
again an infinite number of times?  Could the Kantian categorical imperative be expected 
to produce amor fati?  The moral law, Kant says, does produce in us a feeling of 
respect—a feeling self-wrought by a rational concept.22  It would produce in us respect 
for the moral law and presumably even more so for a moral law that had succeeded in (or 
come close to) regulating an entire life.  Well then, could we expect that a life so 
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regulated by the moral law would engender in us sufficient respect that we should be 
willing to live that life again?  To put it in shorthand, could the Kantian categorical 
imperative lead to amor fati—the embracing of Nietzschean eternal recurrence? 
A much more likely reaction, to be honest, would be that of Aeneas, the most pious of 
men, who nevertheless was appalled when he discovered that he would have to live his 
life again.23  If there is anything about a moral life that should make one want to live it 
again, an infinite number of times, I do not see what it would be.24   
Indeed, I think that the prospect of living one's life over and over again an infinite 
number of times, once "this thought gained possession of you," would sap the Kantian 
moral life of its very significance.  Whatever appeal a moral life might have would be 
undermined by the prospect of repeating it infinitely.  Eternal recurrence obviously 
implies that there is no noumenal realm, no transcendental self, no freedom of the 
Kantian sort.  Every action, every thought, every reflection returns eternally and exactly 
the same.  We have determinism, causality, heteronomy—all the way down.  While 
acting autonomously on the moral law, in Kant's view, would produce in us a sense of 
dignity,25 the prospect of being fated to repeat that same exact action an infinite number 
of times, far from producing an increased sense of dignity, would eliminate autonomy 
and so subvert any dignity. 
Thus, while actions are universalizable for Nietzsche, they are not universalizable in 
Kant's sense.  We might say that for Nietzsche they are subjectively universalizable.  
Whether one is able to universalize them depends upon one's subjectivity—one's attitude.  
Such universalization is not something objective, something we can expect of all rational 
beings.  The Übermensch can will to universalize every detail of his life—will to repeat it 
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eternally—but this is clearly not the case for everyone.  Most people, in fact, would be 
crushed by the idea of eternal recurrence.  Moreover, the Übermensch is able to 
universalize what for Kant is not universalizable.  On the other hand, Kant would not be 




In comparing eternal recurrence and the categorical imperative, then, we have major 
differences between Nietzsche and Kant.  And one of the main differences is that Nietzsche's 
views on eternal recurrence seem to have little to do with morality.  We must begin to explain, 
then, the way in which Nietzsche's views on eternal recurrence are connected with moral 
matters.  Nietzsche says that we should live in such a way that we must wish to live again—we 
will anyway.  This means that we should act as if our acts were all fated—they are anyway.  
The consequence of this, we must now see, is that we should act as if our acts were all 
innocent—they are anyway.  Eternal recurrence, Nietzsche thinks, redeems us from guilt and 
makes us innocent.  This must be explained. 
In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche claims that: 
 
man was surrounded by a fearful void—he did not know how to justify, to 
account for, to affirm himself; he suffered from the problem of his meaning.  He 
also suffered otherwise, he was in the main a sickly animal:  but his problem was 
not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question, "why do I 
suffer?" 
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Man…the one most accustomed to suffering, does not repudiate suffering as 
such; he desires it, he even seeks it out, provided he is shown a meaning for it, a 
purpose of suffering.  The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was 
the curse that lay over mankind…26 
 
We live in an empty and meaningless cosmos, a cosmos that does not care about us, 
and we cannot face this.  Suffering we can handle, but meaningless suffering, suffering 
for no reason at all, we cannot handle.  So what do we do?  Nietzsche thinks we give 
suffering a meaning.  We invent a meaning.  We create an illusion.  The Greeks 
constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus 
occasions to be celebrated by the poets.  Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is 
punishment for sin.27 
Nietzsche even thinks we used to enjoy inflicting suffering on others: 
 
To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more….[I]n the 
days when mankind was not yet ashamed of its cruelty, life on earth was more 
cheerful than it is now….Today, when suffering is always brought forward as the 
principal argument against existence, as the worst question mark, one does well to 
recall the ages in which the opposite opinion prevailed because men were 
unwilling to refrain from making suffer and saw in it an enchantment of the first 
order, a genuine seduction to life.28 
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Why was the infliction of suffering so enjoyable?  Why was it a seduction to life?  
The answer is not, I do not think, that people of past ages were just sadists, as Danto and 
others seem to think.29  Rather, since meaningless suffering is unbearable, we give it a 
meaning.  We make it a punishment and inflict it ourselves.  In doing so, suffering is no 
longer meaningless, it is made to participate in the web of meaning we have created.  
That is why it is so enjoyable to inflict suffering.  That is why it is a seduction to life.  We 
keep meaninglessness at bay.  We engage in practices that invest suffering with the 
meaning it must have for us.  We unconsciously participate in the imposition of meaning.     
But we are not content, in Nietzsche's opinion, merely to inflict suffering on others.  
We go further.  We inflict it upon ourselves.  As society develops and we are unable to 
discharge our instincts outwardly, we direct them within.  We create guilt.30  And priests 
are quick to nurture this new development.31  Just as we inflict suffering on others to keep 
meaningless suffering at bay, so we inflict it upon ourselves.  We give all suffering a 
meaning.  No meaningless suffering is allowed to remain—anywhere.  Meaninglessness 
is eradicated.  And just as inflicting suffering on others was a seduction to life, so in 
inflicting it on ourselves, "life again became very interesting…one no longer protested 
against pain, one thirsted for pain; 'more pain! more pain!'"32   
Nietzsche finds all of this highly objectionable.  And he will not accept any of it.  He 
rejects it completely.  He wants to restore the innocence of existence.  He wants to rid the 
world of guilt and punishment: 
 
This instinct of revenge has so mastered mankind in the course of millennia that 
the whole of metaphysics, psychology, conception of history, but above all 
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morality, is impregnated with it.…He has made even God ill with it, he has 
deprived existence in general of its innocence; namely, by tracing back every state 
of being thus and thus to a will, an intention, a responsible act.  The entire 
doctrine of the will, this most fateful falsification in psychology hitherto, was 
essentially invented for the sake of punishment….[T]he priests at the head of the 
oldest communality:  they wanted to create for themselves a right to take 
revenge—they wanted to create for God a right to take revenge.  To this end, man 
was conceived of as "free"; to this end, every action had to be conceived of as 
willed.…[W]e halcyonians especially are trying with all our might to withdraw, 
banish, and extinguish the concepts of guilt and punishment from the world…33 
 
Thus, Nietzsche's position is that because we cannot accept meaningless suffering, we have 
given it a meaning—as punishment.  We inflict punishment ourselves to invest it with a 
meaning.  In fact, we go even further, we inflict suffering on ourselves internally—we invent 
guilt.  We also invent a will and thus responsibility so that we can be held guilty and so that 
God can have a right to inflict punishment.  Nietzsche wants to reject this whole set of 
meanings that have been given to suffering, return us to the innocence of existence, and 
construct a different meaning for suffering.  Nietzsche says of Buddhism that it did not need 
"to make its suffering and capacity for pain decent to itself by interpreting it as sin—it merely 
says what it feels:  'I suffer'."34  Eternal recurrence, likewise, reduces our suffering just to the 
suffering.  There are no psychological surpluses or increases. 
If our actions repeat eternally, if they must repeat eternally, if they are not something 
we can change, if they are fated, then we cannot be held responsible for them, we cannot 
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be guilty of anything.  It makes no sense to see our suffering as punishment.  We are 
innocent.  Our suffering is not a retribution.  It just happens.  One is no longer 
accountable.35  We are redeemed from sin and guilt.36  Nietzsche says, we must "take the 
concept of punishment which has overrun the whole world and root it out!"  It has 
"robbed of its innocence the whole purely chance character of events."37  Fate, necessity, 
eternal recurrence restore the innocence of existence. 
 
III 
To conclude, I think the preceding has shown that despite Nietzsche's commitment to an 
extreme form of determinism, there is no problem in his advocating that we live in such a way 
that we must wish to live again—we will anyway.  Moreover, it is not unreasonable to describe 
this as an imperative.  Furthermore, this imperative urges us to act as if our acts were all 
innocent—they are anyway.  None of this requires us to act any differently.  It certainly does 
not require changing the past—let alone the whole of past history or our past lives.  It simply 
tries to change the way we view our actions.  It tries to redeem them.  It tries to redeem them 
from sin and guilt.  And thus it does not seem to me unreasonable to describe what we have 
here as in some sense a moral imperative.  And since this moral imperative has a certain 
universal and necessary quality to it, I can see nothing wrong with calling it a categorical 
imperative.  Though, again, we must be careful to remember all of the deep differences that 
have been pointed out between Nietzsche's categorical imperative and Kant's. 
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Notes 
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the laws of nature:  "The universality of law according to which effects are produced 
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